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Abstract
In this paper we estimate hospital costs and evaluate economies of scale
and scope using a generalised multiproduct cost function and a sample of
English NHS Trusts with di¤erent types of ownership, namely Foundation
Trusts and non Foundation Trusts. Evaluating the behaviour of di¤erent
types of hospitals separately might be particularly helpful for the design,
and future developments, of the optimal provider reimbursement tari¤.
Also it might shed some light on the ability of di¤erent types of hospitals
prot from the existence of economies of scale and scope.
Results show that, even though these two group of providers do not
exhibit di¤erences regarding economies of scale, Foundation Trusts exhibit
global diseconomies of scope while non Foundation Trusts exhibit global
scope economies.
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1 Introduction
Since 2000 the English NHS has been the target of a major reform outlined
by a ten-year policy programme announced by the NHS Plan (Department of
Health, 2000) and reinforced by the Wanless Report (Wanless, 2002). With this
reform, the Labour party aimed at bringing England to EU spending average:
We decided to make an historic commitment to a sustained increase in NHS
spending. Over ve years it amounts to an increase of a third in real terms.
Over time, we aim to bring it up to the EU average.(Foreword by the Prime
Minister Tony Blair, the NHS Plan, Department of Health, 2000, p. 8). This
investment would have been implemented through a series of policy reforms
that, to ensure the taxpayer value for money, would have been shaped around
patient needs, with patient choice playing a crucial role.
A package of demand- and supply-side reforms and the areas where these
reforms should apply was set in 2005 in the framework for health reform in
England(Department of Health, 2005). The package included increased patient
choice, new systems of information, a new system of nancial ows (Payment
by Results), increased provider diversity with the introduction of a new legal
status for NHS Trusts (Foundation Trusts) and new commissioning frameworks
with commissioning of health care services from the private sector.
In the context of this paper, we focus our attention mainly on Foundation
Trusts (FTs). In particular we are interested in analyzing whether providers
that have acquired this new legal status are signicantly diverse from the re-
maining with respect to their cost structures and whether FTs will perform
di¤erently under the newly implemented provider reimbursement system, Pay-
ment by Results (PbR).
In 2003 the UK Parliament passed the Health and Social Care Act that
transformed the best performing English NHS Trusts into NHS FTs (Health
and Social Care Act, 2003), with the rst wave of FTs being authorized in 2004
and followed by further waves in subsequent years.
These new trusts are given greater autonomy in order to allow the devel-
opment of business and strategies that better coordinate their nancial and
operating structure with local needs.
With increased planning exibility, extended borrowing freedom and ability
to retain surpluses, FTs are expected to channel investment to local needs and
to improve national targets (Eaton, 2005; Healthcare Commission, 2005). In
particular, compared to non-FTs, FTs face a di¤erent set of constraints (limited
borrowing from private sector under the Prudential Borrowing Limit set by
FTs new regulatory body - Monitor, binding contracts with the organizations
commissioning services from them, use of national tari¤s to price their activities)
and incentives (more control over their own future activity, more control over
appointing directors, more and quicker access to capital investment, more local
control over setting priorities and more freedom in employment of new sta¤)
that may encourage them to change their behavior (Healthcare Commission,
2005).
Even though the Foundation policy has drastically re-shaped the hospital
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sector in England, the most important reform has been the change in the -
nancial incentives in secondary care with the introduction of an activity based
reimbursement system, i.e. PbR.
Also implemented by the government in 2003, the PbR is a prospective
payment system that rewards hospitals and other providers on the basis of their
casemix adjusted activity: hospitals receive a xed payment - the national tari¤
- for each type of treatment supplied (Department of Health, 2002b).
The PbR system is targeted at overcoming the deciencies of both cost-based
reimbursement and negotiated budgets. Incentives for cost control and e¢ cient
behavior are introduced by relating payment directly to activity and by ensuring
that hospitals cannot inuence the price they face. Indeed, under this nancial
arrangement, the price paid for each treatment is independent of the hospital
actual costs and it is xed in advance as the average cost of all hospitals for
each health resource group (HRG).1
As this new activity-based reimbursement policy rewards providers on the
basis of their relative performance, it therefore generates incentives for promot-
ing e¢ ciency and consequently lower costs, it overcomes ine¢ cient spending
arising from the open-ended budgets and it creates incentives for improving
performance. It is then expected that providers reduce slack, increase e¤ort,
reduce lengths of stay, reduce rates of use of ancillary services, reduce the total
ratio of personnel to patients, unbundle services, invest in technology and
acquire hospital supplies more prudently and invest less on clinical research,
continuing education and other discretionary activities (Department of Health,
2002b).
The PbR system assumes that cost di¤erences between providers are exclu-
sively e¢ ciency related and therefore it penalizes providers with costs above the
average. Nevertheless, we argue that hospitals might face exogenous constraints,
that are not e¢ ciency related and that hinder hospitals from improving relative
performance with respect to their peers.
The ability to improve relative performance will depend on the internal struc-
ture of di¤erent providers, with scale and scope of the services provided assuming
an important role. For example, hospitals with a higher installed capacity and
guaranteed levels of activity will, ceteris paribus, benet from scale economies
and will therefore be able to produce at lower costs. Also, hospitals with a
higher installed capacity might o¤er a broader mix of services enabling them to
benet from scope economies. On the other hand, providers obliged to invest
in services with a volatile demand and locked in their own capacity, might ei-
ther supply care far below their capacity and incur into high costs for unused
capacity, or produce unnecessary care by inducing demand.
The hypothesis we want to test is whether these structural di¤erences be-
tween providers are mainly due to technological di¤erences arising from owner-
ship, management and nancial structures: the lower the ability of a provider
to reshape its internal structure and the range and amount of services to be
1HRGs are standard groupings of clinically similar treatments, which use similar levels of
healthcare resources.
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supplied, the higher the relevance of these structural di¤erences.
These issues are particularly relevant for the analysis of the performance
of FTs and non-FTs. Indeed, we would expect that, under new nancial and
managerial freedoms, FTs will invest mainly in services where they are able to
extract economies of scale and scope, with a consequent cost advantage for FTs
with respect to non-FTs that cannot benet from such exibility.
A way to verify the existence of such opportunistic behavior of FTs is to
estimate a cost function for each type of provider, FTs and non-FTs. Evaluating
the behavior of di¤erent typologies of providers separately might be particularly
relevant for the design of their optimal reimbursement and might also have an
impact on the future developments of PbR.
The literature on estimation of hospital scale and scope economies using
cost functions is vaste (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994; Carey, 1997; Dor and
Farley, 1996; Fournier and Michell, 1992; Given, 1996; Hughes and McGuire,
2003; Preyra and Pink, 2006; Scu¤ham et al., 1996; Smet, 2002; Vita, 1990;
Vitaliano, 1987;Wholey et al.) but to the best of our knowledge only Bartlett
and Le Grand (1994) focus on the English case. Using data from the 1990s for
English hospitals the authors show that ward costs rose with increasing scale.
Our analysis departs from theirs on scope, data and methodology.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the empirical methodology adopted in the analysis. Section 3 describes
the data, section 4 the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical methodology
We split our panel of 171 trusts into two groups (54 FTs and 117 non-FTs)
in order to test whether there are any di¤erences in the cost structure between
FTs and non-FTs following the introduction of the Foundation policy which has
made FTs more likely than non-FTs to exploit economies of scale and scope in
the take-up of the whole reform agenda. We use panel data methods (Dor and
Farley, 1996 and Carey, 1997) rather than cross-section models (Cowing and
Holtmann, 1983; Given, 1996; Vita, 1990; Fournier and Mitchell, 1992; Wholey
et al., 1996; Vitaliano, 1987; Preyra and Pink, 2006) because panel data methods
capture hospital-specic e¤ects, such as quality of services, severity of illness and
managerial ability, which are likely to be omitted by cross-section models that
therefore result to be biased.
We therefore track all variables involved in the analysis over time for FTs
before they actually became FTs and investigate how they compare to non-FTs
over time. In doing so, however, we do not intend to evaluate the Foundation
policy using a natural experiment that compares the change in costs for FTs
before and after the policy intervention with the change in costs for non-FTs that
are not undergoing the intervention, over the same period. Instead, we assume
that FTs and non-FTs have di¤erent cost structures and thus we estimate two
separate generalised multiproduct cost functions (Caves et al., 1980), one for
FTs and the other for non-FTs. The advantage of the generalized multiproduct
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cost function with respect to a basic translog multiproduct cost function (Berndt
and Christensen, 1973) is that it allows for the value zero in the permissible
domain of outputs.
For both hospital types, the general form of the generalised multiproduct
cost function is
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in which Cvit equals the total variable costs for trust i in year t where i refers
either to 54 FTs or to 117 non-FTs and t covers 13 years from 1994/95 to
2006/07, Q()jit is the Box-Cox transformed output j for trust i in year t, Plit is
the input price l for trust i in year t, Kit is the xed capital for trust i in year
t and Xit is a vector of r observable factors a¤ecting the dependent variable
for trust i in year t.2 In all models we also include 13 time dummies in order
to capture unobserved heterogeneity due to unavailable variables and potential
time trends present in the regressors: Dt is the year dummy for t = 1 (1994/95),
t = 2 (1995/96), and so on. Finally, ui is the trust-specic e¤ect and eit is the
heteroskedastic component of the error. It is reasonable to think that the error
structure of the model is heteroskedastic because small trusts are more likely to
have their average costs substantially a¤ected by the lack of presence of extreme
clinical cases(Wholey et al., 1996, p.670). A more complete cost model would
take into account also demand uncertainty: The demand uncertainty represents
the level of unexpected emergency arrivals, which is the di¤erence between ac-
tual emergency demand and the forecast demand(Hughes and McGuire, 2003,
pp.1001-1002). However, we were not able to estimate this model because of lack
of monthly data on emergency demand, necessary to estimate the unpredicted
demand.
The cost function (1) must be non-decreasing, homogeneous of degree one
and concave in input prices. In particular, linear homogeneity in input prices
requires that, for l;m = 1; :::; p,
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where the second constraint holds because of symmetry, lm = ml.
Symmetry also requires that jk = kj . Therefore, with 3 outputs (n = 3),
2 input prices (p = 2) and 4 observable factors (r = 4), equation (1) can be
re-written as
2See Appendix A.1 for further details on long-run, short-run and variable cost functions.
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where
Cit  lnCvit   lnP2it
P it  lnP1it   lnP2it
We explore the robustness of our results comparing di¤erent estimation
methods, di¤erent measures of the xed input and di¤erent combinations of
the control variables.
In order to choose the appropriate estimation technique, we perform the
Hausmans specication test for both FTs and non-FTs. According to our
results, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the trust-level e¤ects are modelled
by a random e¤ects model for both FTs and non-FTs. This result may be due
to the fact that, when the number of periods is much smaller than the number
of individuals, the random e¤ects model tends to perform better than the xed
e¤ect one (Carey, 1997).
Once we have identied the appropriate estimation method, we can estimate
two cost functions, one for FTs and the other for non-FTs. Estimating two
separate cost functions has the advantage of estimating di¤erent values of the
Box-Cox parameter  and therefore nding the most suitable cost structure for
each type of hospital.
In Stata 10 (Stata, 2007) we run the random e¤ects model using the GLS
estimator (xtreg, re). The model allows the option of clustering on trusts and
the calculation of robust standard errors.
The value of the parameter  is found from an iterative grid search. The
criteria for selecting optimal values of  is minimizing the sum of squared errors
of the random e¤ects model. The search ranges between -10 and 10, with an
initial gradient of 0.2 and a 0.00001 gradient around the conversion point.
The least squares estimates and the estimated value of  constitute the least
squares estimates of all the parameters involved in the empirical analysis. How-
ever, as the optimal value of  is an estimate, the least squares standard errors
underestimate the correct asymptotic standard errors (Greene, 2003, p.174). To
get the appropriate values of the standard errors, we therefore need the deriva-
tive of the right-hand side of (2) with respect to all parameters and . We then
use these derivatives to estimate the variance matrix of the estimated parame-
ters. Further details on Box-Cox transformation and estimates of parameters
can be found in Greene (2003), pp.173-175, and Cameron and Trivedi (2005),
pp. 726-729 and 734-736. The Stata program developed for FTs and non-FTs
is available on request.
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The least squares estimates of the parameters are then used to calculate
economies of scale and to test for the existence of economies of scope.
Once we have the estimated costs for FTs and non-FTs, we are able to check
for the existence of economies of scale and scope and for weak cost complemen-
tarities, for each type of hospital.
3 Data description
Our data are annual and cover all acute and specialist trusts in England for a
period of 13 years starting in 1994/95.
The dependent variable Cv is dened as the annual operating expenses,
excluding land, buildings and dwellings.
Output is measured by the total number of inpatient spells (Q1), the total
number of outpatient attendances (Q2), including rst attendance and subse-
quent ones, and the total number of A&E attendances (Q3), including rst
attendance and subsequent ones.
As clinical and general supply prices (including drugs) are uniformly set by
the Purchasing and Supply Agency, an NHS regulatory agency (http://www.pasa.
nhs.uk/pasaweb/productsandservices/pharmaceuticals/landingpage.htm), we only
consider in the analysis variable input prices relating to medical and non-medical
sta¤, including consultants, nurses, administrative sta¤, housekeeping, kitchen,
laundry and maintenance sta¤. Input prices for medical and non-medical sta¤
(labelled P1 and P2, respectively) are derived from annual data on total salaries
and wages for each group measured as a proportion of the respective WTE sta¤
employed (see also Scu¤ham et al., 1996).
The xed input is measured by either the annual amount of xed assets
employed (assets, K), the most appropriate -but not always available- measure
of capital input, or the average number of available beds (beds, K), in order to
have results comparable with those of the existing literature on hospital costs.
Some control variables are included in the model to assess trust-specic char-
acteristics such as the average length of stay, the patient load, the competition
between trusts and the teaching status. The average length of stay (X1) is cal-
culated as the average number of days spent by each inpatient in hospital. This
variable is included in the empirical specication to control for the outpatient
variation among inpatients not captured by the number of inpatient spells. The
trust caseload severity is measured by the casemix index (X2). The casemix
index is a weighted average of the procedures performed at each trust. The
higher the index, the more ill, on average, the patients treated at the hospi-
tal. As the average length of stay, the casemix index is also used to control for
outpatient variation among inpatients not captured by the number of inpatient
spells. Competition between trusts is measured by the number of trusts within
a 20km range of each trust (X3). This is a plain measure of competition dened
on the simple number of neighbor competitors and used to control for non-price
competition (e.g., quality and/or demand competition), instead of price compe-
tition (e.g., technical e¢ ciency). The teaching status is identied by a dummy
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variable (X4) which takes value 1 if the trust is a teaching hospital and value 0
otherwise.
4 Empirical results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and the ex-
planatory variables included in the model.
[Table 1 about here]
In Table 2 we present some t-tests on the di¤erences between FTs and non-
FTs. Given the degrees of freedom, (Nnon FTs   1) + (NFTs   1), the critical
value of the 2-tailed t-statistic is equal to 1:960. If the t-statistic is lower than the
critical value 1:960, we fail to reject the null and we conclude that the di¤erent
between FTs and non-FTs is signicantly not di¤erent from zero. Therefore,
di¤erences between FTs and non-FTs are signicantly not di¤erent from zero
regarding number of A&E attendances, number of available beds, the casemix
index and the competition index. FTs and non-FTs are instead di¤erent in terms
of number of inpatient spells (because FTs are paid according to the number of
patients they treat), number of outpatient attendances (because FTs can control
and organize their own elective activity), input prices (because FTs can freely
set di¤erent salaries, within the national grade salary scheme), amount of assets
employed (because FTs have more freedom in investment), average length of
stay (because FTs may discharge patients quicker than non-FTs) and teaching
status. In particular, we look at the test on the number of available beds, used
as test on the size of FTs compared to non-FTs. We fail to reject the null and
we conclude that the di¤erent in size between FTs and non-FTs is signicantly
not di¤erent from zero. In other words, dixoerences in costs between FTs and
non-FTs are not due to the fact that they operate at dixoerent points on the
same cost function.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 presents the least square estimates of the parameters of the gener-
alized translog multiproduct cost function.
[Table 3 about here]
The coe¢ cients of the output parameters (1 to 3) are always positive, if
signicant. Therefore, the cost function is non-decreasing in the levels of output.
In particular, an increase of 1% in the inpatient activity implies that variable
costs increase between 27% and 61% for FTs and between 18% and 38% for non-
FTs. The impact of outpatient activity is not signicant for FTs (and anyway
small: limited to a decrease of 1   2% of the variable costs increase). On the
other hand, an increase of 1% in the outpatient activity of non-FTs implies an
increase of 23%   27% in their variable costs. The impact of A&E activity on
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total variable costs is not signicant for both FTs and non-FTs (and anyway
small: up to 5% for FTs and 1  2% for non-FTs).
The normalization of the right-hand side variables results in the rst-order
input price parameter 1 having coe¢ cient equal to the cost elasticity at the
mean for the corresponding variable: 1 is equal to the average cost share for
the medical sta¤ with respect to the non-medical sta¤.
The coe¢ cients of the parameters 1 and 2 are always positive and negative,
respectively, implying that the cost function is non-decreasing and concave in
the input prices. Linear homogeneity is always veried as it has been imposed
by the constraint
pX
l=1
l = 1.
The coe¢ cient of the parameter 1 is always positive and signicant. This
result implies that both FTs and non-FTs are not in the long-run equilibrium
(see the Appendix A for a discussion on equilibrium and a test for it).
The coe¢ cients of the parameters 1 to 4 are always positive. An increase
in the average length of stay (1) implies an increase in the costs associated to
inpatient activity and therefore an increase in total variable costs. Total variable
costs increase up to 19% for FTs and between 3% and 21% for non-FTs. An
increase in the casemix index (2) implies that patients treated are, on average,
more severly ill and therefore that total variable costs increase, between 34%
and 70% for FTs and around 12 13% for non-FTs. An increase in competition
(3) implies that trusts have to spend more in order to attract more patients
and consequently total variable costs increase, between up to 8% for FTs and
around 2   3% for non-FTs.3 Finally, the presence of a teaching unit within
the trust implies an increase in total variable costs by 41  48% for FTs and by
32  38% for non-FTs.
The coe¢ cient of the intercept is ambiguous: the dependent variable will
be positive for positive values of outputs and input prices, when 0 is positive;
negative for positive values of outputs and input prices, when 0 is negative.4
Finally, it seems that, while the cost structure of FTs is well represented by
a generalized cost function ( > 1 either if we use assets as a proxy for the xed
input or if we use beds), the cost structure of non-FTs is closer to a translog
cost function as the parameter  is closer to zero (0:54808 when we use assets
and 0:60999 when we use beds).
Using the parameters of the variable cost function (2), economies of scale
are calculated applying the following formula
ESR (K) =
1  1
3X
j=1
j
(3)
3Note that, being health care free at the point of use in England, trusts compete for
patients on the quality of the services provided: increased competition implies higher quality
investment.
4Remember that our dependent variable is Cit  lnCvit  lnP2it, which explains why costs
may be negative.
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(see Appendix A.1 for further details on derivation of the formula).
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 presents estimates of the degree of scale economies at the mean outputs.
Both FTs and non-FTs face economies of scale, with non-FTs having a greater
advantage in increasing the provision of o¤ered services when using xed assets
employed as a proxy for capital (1:22 versus 1:18) and FTs having a greater
advantage in increasing the provision of o¤ered services when using available
beds as a proxy for capital (1:51 versus 1:30). These gures imply that increasing
all of the average hospitals outputs by 1% induce a total variable cost increase
between 0:66% and 0:85% for FTs and between 0:77% and 0:82% for non-FTs.
In order to check the robustness of this result, we conduct a test for all the
three output measures (see Mester, 1987). Doubling or halving the levels of
output activities one by one while keeping all the other variables constant, does
not really make any di¤erence in terms of economies of scale for either FTs or
non-FTs, with two exceptions. Doubling the level of inpatient activities, both
FTs and non-FTs experience diseconomies of scale, with an increase in total
variable costs between 1:24% and 1:82% for FTs and between 1:10% and 1:29%
for non-FTs; doubling the level of outpatient visits, only non-FTs experience
diseconomies of scale, with an increase in total variable costs between 1:16%
and 1:19%. These ndings are consistent with the literature (Mester, 1987).
In the case of three outputs, global scope economies exist if
SCOPE =
Cv(Q1; 0; 0) + C
v(0; Q2; 0) + C
v(0; 0; Q3)  Cv(Q1; Q2; Q3)
Cv(Q1; Q2; Q3)
> 0
(4)
where Cv(Q1; 0; 0), Cv(0; Q2; 0) and Cv(0; 0; Q3) are the estimated variable
costs associated to the exclusive production of Q1, Q2 and Q3 respectively and
Cv(Q1; Q2; Q3) is the estimated variable cost associated to the joint production
of Q1, Q2 and Q3.
Since FTs and non-FTs exhibit di¤erent global scope economies, we also
look at product-specic economies of scope, in order to check choices relative to
each service provided. Product-specic economies of scope exist if
SCOPEj =
Cv(Qj) + C
v(Q j)  Cv(Q1; Q2; Q3)
Cv(Q1; Q2; Q3)
> 0 (5)
where Cv(Qj) is the cost of producing only output j and Cv(Q j) is the cost
of producing all the other outputs di¤erent from output j.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 presents the estimates of global and product-specic scope economies.
While FTs exhibit global diseconomies of scope, non-FTs exhibit strong global
economies of scope. If we look at product-specic economies of scope, FTs
always exhibit diseconomies of scope (with the exception of inpatient activity
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when the xed input is measured by the annual amount of xed assets em-
ployed), while non-FTs always exhibit economies of scope. These results are
more informative when analyzing weak cost complementarities between pairs of
output. Weak cost complementarities allow to infer whether an increase in the
level of one service has an impact on the marginal cost of providing another.
Unlike scope economies these pairwise comparisons only give insights on how
the cost functions behave on a local neighborhood and therefore do not allow
to infer on global cost savings (Fraquelli et al., 2004).
Weak cost complementarities exist if
@2C
@Qj@Qk
= jk + jk  0 and @
2C
@Qj@K
= j  0 (6)
(see Appendix A.2 for more details on how these conditions are derived).
[Table 6 about here]
Since symmetry holds, jk = kj . Thus condition (6) implies that a trust
may face a cost advantage if it decides to diversify the provision of services by
carrying on service j joint with service k and service k joint with service j.
Looking at Table 6, FTs face a cost disadvantage if they decide to carry on
inpatient and outpatient services (when using available beds as a proxy for the
stock of capital), while non-FTs face a cost advantage if they decide to carry
on A&E and outpatient services (independently of the variable used as a proxy
for the stock of capital).
5 Discussion and conclusions
In the previous section we tested whether we could detect any di¤erences be-
tween FTs and non-FTs in terms of cost saving arising from increasing the pro-
vision of o¤ered services (economies of scale) or from diversifying the provision
of services by carrying on various services (economies of scope).
In order to evaluate economies of scale and scope, we estimate two sepa-
rate cost functions, one for each type of provider, using a generalized translog
multiproduct cost function on a panel of English hospitals. Once we have the
estimated costs for FTs and non-FTs, we are able to check for the existence of
economies of scale and scope for each type of hospital.
While we cannot detect any di¤erence between FTs and non-FTs in terms
of economies of scale, we nd di¤erent patterns between FTs and non-FTs in
terms of economies of scope. Results show that FTs cost function exhibits
global diseconomies of scope, while non-FTs can prot from global economies
of scope.
These results have signicant policy implications, especially since both the
Foundation policy and the PbR push FTs against diversication and therefore
in favour of separate production of alternative services (specialization). Given
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the extended new freedoms, our results show that FTs could achieve e¢ ciency
gains if they would o¤er di¤erent services on di¤erent sites.
On the other side of the spectrum, the fact that non-FTs are locked in their
own capacity and constrained to provide broad range of services does not seem
to be problematic to non-FTs as their technology exhibits e¢ ciency gains from
joint production of outpatient, inpatient and A&E services. However the extent
to which they can e¤ectively prot from this technology feature will depend on
whether local demand characteristics as well as PCT commissioning practices
allow them to deliver an e¢ cient mix of inpatient, outpatient and A&E services.
Our results on cost complementarities shed some light on the optimal service
portfolio for FTs and non-FTs. FTs face a cost disadvantage if they decide to
carry on inpatient and outpatient services: the joint production of inpatient and
outpatient services have negative e¤ects on cost savings. On the other hand,
non-FTs face a cost advantage if they decide to carry on A&E and outpatient
services: any potential cost savings from joint production can be realized only
through a limited range of hospital services. However, these pairwise compar-
isons only give insights on how the cost functions behave on a local neighborhood
and therefore do not allow to infer on global cost savings.
Still, on the grounds of e¢ ciency, concentrating the delivery of services will
lead to cost savings, with larger hospitals achieving economies of scale. Results
also show that there are strong arguments for creating larger hospital units to
facilitate links between departments, to foster multidisciplinary teams and to
ensure optimal use of expensive resources. These can be achieved either by
investing on additional capacity for each provider or through hospital mergers,
being the former more likely to lead to less caveats.
Indeed the literature on hospital scale and scope economies shows that merg-
ers do not necessarily undertake to concentrate facilities in order to attain re-
duced total costs. This might be due to the possibility of increased management
costs in the long-run and to the di¢ culty of integrating sta¤ and systems.
Although e¢ ciency gains and better competition may be achieved through
specialization and single unit capacity growing, these savings can come at the
cost of loosing the localness of health care provision and therefore the di-
rect contact with the community. Indeed, given the geographical distribution of
providers, hospital mergers are likely to reduce access to health care, increasing
inequalities. This is especially the case of providers in rural areas. In this con-
text, it is crucial that PCTs balance the needs of both demand and supply of
secondary care, by ensuring their local population access to key services whilst
encouraging hospitalse¢ ciency gains.
Given that, under a xed price regime (such as the PbR), the revenue stream
depends on relative e¢ ciency performance and therefore only the most e¢ cient
trusts will ourish, in the long-run such a payment system might discriminate
in favour of those providers that are in a better position to exploit scale and
scope economies by reorganizing the o¤er of their services (such as FTs) or
might even discriminate against providers that either face capacity constraints
or are limited on the mix of services commissioned by the purchasers (such as
non-FTs).
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Our analysis has therefore implications for the design of the tari¤ payable to
di¤erent types of providers in order, not only to better achieve PbR e¢ ciency
targets, but also to avoid discrimination and inequitable treatment between
providers. If these di¤erences across providers are indeed exogenous and not
e¢ ciency related, then a unique price system applied to di¤erent typologies of
providers -as PbR is- will discriminate against non-FTs, widening the perfor-
mance gap between FTs and non-FTs. Indeed, both the Foundation status and
the PbR policies have been frequently seen as policies that encourage a two tier
system, locking up non-FTs in a sort of poverty trap(Marini et. al, 2008).
In conclusion, a combination of Foundation policy and PbR might reinforce
the gap between FTs and non-FTs and could be particularly lethal for non-FTs,
leading to a two-tier systems with FTs outperforming non-FTs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Economies of scale
The use of a multiproduct cost function gives rise to scale economies. Ray scale
economies are dened as the proportional increase in total costs that would
result from a proportional increase in all outputs.
If it is believed that hospitals operate in equilibrium, it is appropriate to
estimate a long-run cost function
C = C (Q;P ) (A.1)
Baumol et al. (1982) dene the degree of ray economies of scale at output vector
Q in a multiproduct rm as
ESR =
1
nX
j=1
@C(Q;P )
@Qj
Qj
C(Q;P )
(A.2)
under the assumption that all of the rms inputs can be freely varied to min-
imize total costs, i.e. under the assumption that the rm is operating in equi-
librium. Ray economies of scale measure overall economies of scale and assume
that the composition of the output bundle remains xed while the size of the
composite output bundle can vary. The production is characterized by constant
returns to scale if ESR equals one. Ray economies or diseconomies of scale are
said to exist if ESR is greater than or less than one, respectively. ESR can be
interpreted as the elasticity of the output of the relevant composite commodity
with respect to the cost needed to produce it(Baumol et al., 1982, p. 51).
However, if not all inputs can be adjusted quickly in response to chang-
ing output levels or changing input prices, hospitals will only employ optimal
quantities of the adjustable variable inputs (e.g., labour), given the non-optimal
levels of the xed inputs (e.g., capital stock). In this case, it is more appropriate
to estimate a short-run cost function
Cs = Cv (Q;PL;K) + PKK (A.3)
in which Cv (Q;PL;K) are the variable costs and PKK are the (short-run) xed
costs, PL is the price vector of variable inputs and PK is the price of the xed
input K.5
5A well known empirical test for short- versus long-run equilibrium (Vita, 1990, and Cowing
& Holtmann, 1983) consists in estimating the variable costs Cv (Q;PL;K) and verifying that
the envelope condition, @Cv (Q;PL;K) =@K + PK = 0, holds (see Smet, 2002, for a survey
on this test). If the envelope condition holds, hospitals operate in equilibrium. Solving the
envelope condition for K, the cost-minimising level of K, and substituting K into the short-
run cost function (A.3) yields the long-run cost function: Cv (Q;PL;K)+PKK = C (Q;P ).
On the other hand, if the envelope condition does not hold, hospitals only employ optimal
quantities of the adjustable variable inputs and the appropriate cost function to be estimated
is the (A.3). Further details can also be found in Smet (2002).
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When the structure of production is analyzed via the estimation of a variable
cost function, two methods can used to infer the degree of ray economies of scale.
One consists of using the estimated parameters and the price of the xed input,
applying the envelope condition, @Cv (Q;PL;K) =@K+PK = 0, to solve for the
optimal level of the xed factor, and deriving the long-run cost function. Long-
run scale economies can then be derived by evaluating the long-run cost function
(Vita, 1990, and Braeutigam and Daughety, 1983). Using the parameters from
the variable cost function, the formula for ray economies of scale becomes
ESR (K
) =
1  @Cv(Q;PL;K)@K KCv(Q;PL;K)

K=K
nX
j=1
@Cv(Q;PL;K)
@Qj
Qj
Cv(Q;PL;K)

K=K
(A.4)
Evaluated at the optimal levels of the xed inputs, K, equation (A.4) is equiv-
alent to the Baumol et al. denition (A.2). At K = K, @C
v(Q;PL;K
)
@K = 0
(because the xed input is set at its cost-minimising optimal level) and the
(A.4) coincides with the (A.2).
An alternative approach proposed by Caves et al. (1981) calculates a mea-
sure of scale economies using the parameters of the variable cost function, with-
out reference to the prices of the xed factors. Instead of the optimal value
of the xed factor, the estimated value is used in the calculation of the ray
economies of scale. The formula for ray economies of scale becomes
ESR (K) =
1  @Cv(Q;PL;K)@K KCv(Q;PL;K)
nX
j=1
@Cv(Q;PL;K)
@Qj
Qj
Cv(Q;PL;K)
(A.5)
When applying the method proposed by Caves et al. (1981), it should be kept
in mind that it will generally not yield the same estimate of scale economies
as would be obtained by enveloping the variable cost function (see Braeutigam
and Daughety, 1983). The latter method evaluates scale economies along a ray
from the origin that passes through the actual point of operation observed in
the sample. Since the motivation for adopting the variable cost framework is
the belief that the rms being studied are not necessarily operating on their
e¢ cient expansion path, scale economy estimates computed using the second
method would rarely be expected to coincide with those derived using the rst.
As most studies argue that there is no evidence that hospitals operate in
their long-run equilibrium, to avoid estimation bias, we estimate a variable cost
function in which hospitals minimize variable costs, given the stock of capi-
tal and exogenous input prices and output quantities, then check the envelope
condition and proceed accordingly, as explained previously.
If a variable cost function is estimated with the generalized multiproduct
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cost function,
lnCvit = 0 +
nX
j=1
jQ
()
jit +
1
2
nX
j=1
nX
k=1
jkQ
()
jitQ
()
kit +
pX
l=1
l lnPlit + (A.6)
+
1
2
pX
l=1
pX
m=1
lm lnPlit lnPmit +
nX
j=1
pX
l=1
jlQ
()
jit lnPlit +
+1 lnKit +
1
2
2 (lnKit)
2
+
nX
j=1
jQ
()
jit lnKit +
pX
l=1
l lnPlit lnKit
the elasticity of cost with respect to any individual output (e.g., Qj) is given by
C;Qj =
@Cv (Q;PL; K)
@Qj
Qj
Cv (Q;PL; K)
= exp (RHS)

"
jQ
 1
j +
1
2
nX
k=1
jkQ
 1
j Q
()
k +
pX
l=1
jlQ
 1
j lnPl + jQ
 1
j lnK
#
 Qj
Cv (Q;PL; K)
= C
v
(Q;PL; K)
"
j +
1
2
nX
k=1
jkQ
()
k +
pX
l=1
jl lnPl + j lnK
#
Q 1j 
Qj
Cv (Q;PL; K)
=
"
j +
1
2
nX
k=1
jkQ
()
k +
pX
l=1
jl lnPl + j lnK
#
Qj = j
in which RHS identies the right-hand side of equation (A.6). At the sam-
ple mean, the normalization of the right-hand-side variables of equation (A.6)
causes the cost elasticity for each output Qj to equal j , the rst-order output
parameter from the estimated cost function.
On the other hand, the elasticity of cost with respect to the xed input K
is given by
C;K =
@Cv
 
Q;PL;K

@K
K
Cv
 
Q;PL;K
 = exp (RHS)

2641 1
K
+ 2
lnK
K
+
nX
j=1
j
Q
()
j
K
+
pX
l=1
l
lnPl
K
375  K
Cv
 
Q;PL;K

= C
v  
Q;PL;K
 
241 + 2 lnK + nX
j=1
jQ
()
j
+
pX
l=1
l lnPl
35  1
K

K
Cv
 
Q;PL;K

=
241 + 2 lnK + nX
j=1
jQ
()
j
+
pX
l=1
l lnPl
35 = 1
At the sample mean, the normalization of the right-hand-side variables of equa-
tion (A.6) causes the cost elasticity for the xed input K to equal 1, the
rst-order output parameter from the estimated cost function.
Therefore, when the variable cost function is estimated with a generalized
multiproduct cost function (A.6), equations (A.4) and (A.5) become
ESR (K
) =
1
nX
j=1
j
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and
ESR (K) =
1  1
nX
j=1
j
A.2 Weak cost complementarities
Weak cost complementarities exist if
@2C
@Qj@Qk
 0 (A.7)
where C is the long-run cost function (A.1). This condition can be related to
the variable cost function according to the following decomposition
@2C
@Qj@Qk
=
@2Cv
@Qj@Qk
+
@2Cv
@Qj@K
@K
@Qk
 0
If we assume @K=@Qk > 0, then a su¢ cient condition for the validity of the
(B.3) is
@2Cv
@Qj@Qk
 0 and @
2Cv
@Qj@K
 0
a necessary condition is
@2Cv
@Qj@Qk
 0 or @
2Cv
@Qj@K
 0
When the variable cost function is estimated with equation (A.6), at the
sample mean, the above conditions reduce to
@2Cv
@Qj@Qk
= exp (RHS)
8>>>><>>>>:
24kQ 1k + 12 nX
j=1
jkQ
()
j
Q
 1
k
+
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l=1
klQ
 1
k
lnPl + kQ
 1
k
lnK
35

24jQ 1j + 12 nX
k=1
jkQ
 1
j
Q
()
k
+
pX
l=1
jlQ
 1
j
lnPl + jQ
 1
j
lnK
35+
+
h
jkQ
 1
j
Q
 1
k
i
9>>>>=>>>>;
=
= C
v  
Q;PL;K

Q
 1
j
Q
 1
k
8>>><>>>:
24k + 12 nX
j=1
jkQ
()
j
+
pX
l=1
kl lnPl + k lnK
35

24j + 12 nX
k=1
jkQ
()
k
+
pX
l=1
jl lnPl + j lnK
35 + jk
9>>>=>>>;
=
= C
v  
Q;PL;K

Q
 1
j
Q
 1
k

jk + jk

= jk + jk
and
@2Cv
@Qj@K
= exp (RHS)

jQ
 1
j
1
K

= Cv (Q;PL;K)Q
 1
j
1
K
j = j
since @ exp(RHS)@K =
@Cv(Q;PL;K
)
@K = 0.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and variable definitions, pooled data 1994/95-2006/07 
Variable 
name Definition (Source) 
Non-FTs FTs 
N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Cv Annual operating expenses (000000) (CIPFA) 2057 112 87.30 3.32 7.36 627 133 107 6.82 664 
Outputs 
Q1 Total number of inpatient spells (HES) 2086 50720.39 32317.79 222 232033 632 56214.18 33703.08 1040 188551 
Q2 
Total number of outpatient attendances 
(HES) 2048 200713.20 151212.30 0 3667170 632 223657.80 147291.50 0 1333426 
Q3 
Total number of emergency attendances 
(HES) 2045 64143.96 44616.53 0 426295 626 63338.30 41984.36 0 197398 
Input prices 
P1 
Medical staff price (derived from CIPFA 
and IC) 1653 70021.52 25198.79 9826.47 683548.90 547 65560.61 22818.72 12437.64 240313.90 
P2 
Non-medical staff price (CIPFA and 
Information Centre) 987 27896.21 5592.16 16913.59 49775.40 414 24215.23 7925.98 4325.25 45281.29 
Capital input 
K (assets) Annual amount of fixed assets employed (000000) (CIPFA) 2031 92.20 67 5.39 500 626 108 95.90 5.76 756 
K (beds) Average number of available beds (HAS) 2118 673.04 364.50 4 2838.14 634 696.02 402.88 13.54 2058.78 
Other explanatory variables 
X1 Average length of stay (HES) 1862 6.43 7.58 1.10 136.81 589 5.33 2.54 0.61 23.10 
X2 
HRG casemix index based on Reference 
Costs (NHSIA) 2074 100.87 24.37 68.54 306.13 622 100.86 22.75 67.11 256.02 
X3 
Number of trusts within a 20km range of 
each trust (derived) 1620 9.98 13.60 0 62 584 10.55 14.03 0 59 
X4 
Dummy variable =1 if Trust is teaching 
hospital; =0 otherwise (derived) 2131 0.10 0.30 0 1 637 0.19 0.40 0 1 
CIPFA - Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, http://www.cipfastats.net/health/default.asp 
HES - Hospital Episodes Statistics, http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk 
IC - Information Centre, http://www.ic.nhs.uk 
HAS - Hospital Activity Statistics, http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/hospital activity 
NHSIA - NHS Information Authority, http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk and http://www.ic.nhs.uk 
 
Table 2. t-tests on the differences between FTs and non-FTs 
 
FTs
FTsnon
N
N   
FTs
FTsnon

 
 FTsFTsnon    2
2
FTs
FTsnon

   
FTsFTs
FTsnonFTsnon
N
N
/
/
2
2

   
FTs
FTs
FTsnon
FTsnon
NN
22  

  
FTs
FTs
FTsnon
FTsnon
FTsFTsnon
NN
t
22 






d.f. 
C 
non-
FTs 2057 112 21 7621.29 3.71 4.69 4.48 2682 
FTs 627 133 11449 18.26 
Q1 
non-
FTs 2086 50720.39 5493.79 1044439550 500690.10 1515.91 3.62 2716 
FTs 632 56214.18 1135897601 1797306.33 
Q2 
non-
FTs 2048 200713.20 22944.6 22865159671 11164628.75 6744.76 3.40 2678 
FTs 632 223657.80 21694785972 34327192.99 
Q3 
non-
FTs 2045 64143.96 805.66 1990634749 973415.53 1946.59 0.41 2669 
FTs 626 63338.30 1762686485 2815793.11 
P1 
non-
FTs 1653 70021.52 4460.91 634979017 384137.34 1155.87 3.86 2198 
FTs 547 65560.61 520693982 951908.56 
P2 
non-
FTs 987 27896.21 3680.98 31272253 31684.15 428.28 8.59 1399 
FTs 414 24215.23 62821159 151741.93 
K (assets) 
non-
FTs 2031 92.20 15.8 4489 2.21 4.11 3.84 2655 
FTs 626 108 9197 14.69 
K (beds) 
non-
FTs 2118 673.04 22.9756 132857.99 62.73 17.85 1.29 2750 
FTs 634 696.02 162314 256.02 
X1 
non-
FTs 1862 6.43 1.1 57.39 0.03 0.20 5.38 2449 
FTs 589 5.33 6 0.01 
X2 
non-
FTs 2074 100.87 0.01 593.8000 0.29 1.06 0.01 2694 
FTs 622 100.86 518.0000 0.83 
X3 
non-
FTs 1620 9.98 0.57 184.87 0.11 0.67 0.85 2202 
FTs 584 10.55 197 0.34 
X4 
non-
FTs 2131 0.1 0.09 0.0900 0.00 0.02 5.25 2766 
FTs 637 0.19 0.1600 0.00 
Table 3. Estimates for the random effects model 
Variable name Parameter name 
K (fixed assets employed) K (available beds) 
FTs non-FTs FTs non-FTs 
Q1 α1 0.612*** 0.377*** 0.268** 0.180*** 
  (0.142) (0.0264) (0.106) (0.0276) 
Q2 α2 -0.0109 0.272*** -0.0162 0.228*** 
  (0.103) (0.0260) (0.0508) (0.0275) 
Q3 α3 -0.0669 0.0157 0.0537 0.0129 
  (0.100) (0.0148) (0.0647) (0.0155) 
2
1Q  α11 -0.385** 0.243*** -0.0252 0.185*** 
  (0.189) (0.0498) (0.01783) (0.0618) 
2
2Q  α22 -0.00366 -0.109*** -0.000146 -0.0878*** 
  (0.014) (0.0205) (0.00053) (0.0191) 
2
3Q  α33 0.0177 -0.00223 0.0274 0.00994 
  (0.178) (0.0237) (0.0287) (0.0207) 
Q1Q2 α12 -0.0320 -0.0779** 0.00328 -0.108** 
  (0.036) (0.0309) (0.00300) (0.0518) 
Q1Q3 α13 -0.0183 -0.0705** -0.00193 -0.0750** 
  (0.116) (0.0327) (0.0142) (0.0353) 
Q2Q3 α23 0.121 0.0229 0.0123 0.0185 
  (0.080) (0.0323) (0.0113) (0.0329) 
Q1 P  1 0.939** 0.120 0.399** 0.226** 
  (0.431) (0.086) (0.162) (0.104) 
Q2 P  2 -0.346 -0.170* -0.176** -0.0858 
  (0.300) (0.092) (0.0806) (0.0912) 
Q3 P  3 -0.0789 -0.0135 -0.309* 0.0342 
  (0.311) (0.0575) (0.162) (0.0584) 
Q1lnK η1 0.464** -0.161*** -0.00657 -0.0780 
  (0.192) (0.0358) (0.093) (0.092) 
Q2lnK η2 0.00167 0.00367 -0.0608 0.0548 
  (0.097) (0.0338) (0.0570) (0.0727) 
Q3lnK η3 -0.261** 0.0603** -0.290** 0.0482 
  (0.129) (0.0246) (0.126) (0.0526) 
P  β1 0.303 0.460*** 0.319 0.430*** 
  (0.193) (0.0420) (0.211) (0.0440) 
2
P  β2 -1.719*** -0.702*** -1.467** -0.628*** 
  (0.635) (0.151) (0.627) (0.147) 
lnK γ1 0.369*** 0.190*** 0.539*** 0.453*** 
  (0.088) (0.0199) (0.135) (0.0330) 
lnK2 γ2 -0.0440 0.104*** 0.181** 0.0733 
  (0.161) (0.0258) (0.080) (0.138) 
P lnK θ -0.140 0.0314 0.119 -0.273** 
  (0.223) (0.0522) (0.175) (0.119) 
X1 μ1 0.190* 0.210*** 0.00228 0.0257 
  (0.103) (0.0214) (0.1250) (0.0213) 
X2 μ2 0.344 0.126** 0.702** 0.117* 
  (0.332) (0.0610) (0.357) (0.0611) 
X3 μ3 0.000593 0.0179** 0.0834** 0.0255*** 
  (0.0370) (0.0089) (0.0391) (0.0090) 
X4 μ4 0.413*** 0.320*** 0.483*** 0.381*** 
  (0.094) (0.0442) (0.109) (0.0427) 
Intercept α0 0.0551 -0.207*** -0.0184 0.0732 
  (0.335) (0.0688) (0.370) (0.0695) 
Box-Cox 
parameter π 2.0387321*** 0.54807633*** 3.814533*** 0.60999477*** 
  (0.319) (0.101) (0.419) (0.110) 
σu 0.094 0.112 0.142 0.122 
σe 0.334 0.081 0.330 0.079 
ρ 0.074 0.657 0.155 0.707 
R-squared 0.834 0.930 0.825 0.929 
Observations 336 801 336 802 
Number of hospitals 47 126 47 126 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Time dummies not reported. 
 
 
Table 4. Ray economies of scale 
Parameter name 
K (fixed assets employed) K (available beds) 
FTs non-FTs FTs non-FTs 
α1 0.612 0.377 0.268 0.180 
α2 -0.0109 0.272 -0.0162 0.228 
α3 -0.0669 0.0157 0.0537 0.0129 
γ1 0.369 0.190 0.539 0.453 
ESR(K)  1.18121 1.21859 1.50900 1.29960 
 
 
Table 5. Global and product-specific economies of scope 
 K (fixed assets employed) K (available beds) 
 FTs non-FTs FTs non-FTs 
Global -0.572 1.439 -0.310 1.724 
Q1 0.081 0.821 -0.189 0.989 
Q2 -0.379 0.726 -0.627 0.891 
Q3 -0.592 0.689 -0.071 0.814 
 
 
Table 6. Test for Weak Cost Complementarities 
Parameter name 
K (fixed assets employed) K (available beds) 
FTs non-FTs FTs non-FTs 
α1α2+ α12 -0.03867 0.02464 -0.00106 -0.06696 
α1α3+ α13 -0.05924 -0.06458 0.01246 -0.07268 
α2α3+ α23 0.12173 0.02717 0.01143 0.02144 
η1 0.464 -0.161 -0.00657 -0.078 
η2 0.00167 0.00367 -0.0608 0.0548 
η3 -0.261 0.0603 -0.290 0.0482 
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